## **EAST Search History**

Ref #	Hits	Search Query	DBs	Default Operator	Plurals	Time Stamp
L1	5	(((authenticat\$3 adj5 (value or number or identifier)) near5 (compar\$3 or match\$3)) and (integrity adj5 message)).clm.	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:57
<b>L2</b>	306	380/247.ccls.	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:55
L3	421	380/255.ccls.	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:55
L4	0	370/12.ccls.	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:55
L5	1284	370/445.ccls.	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:56
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L11	5	(((authenticat\$3 adj5 (value or number or identifier)) near5 (compar\$3 or match\$3)) same (integrity adj5 message))	US-PGPUB; USPAT; EPO; JPO; DERWENT; IBM_TDB	OR	ON	2007/03/09 11:58

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Group Key Management and Signatures: Provably authenticated group Diffie-

Hellman key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, Jean-Jacques Quisquater November 2001 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and **Communications Security CCS '01** 

Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(578.14 KB)

Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, citings, index terms

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal ...

2 SPINS: security protocols for sensor netowrks

. Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, J. D. Tygar

July 2001 Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking MobiCom '01

Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(242.17 KB)

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As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, much research has focused on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and has not concentrated on security.

We present a suite of security building blocks optimized for resource-constrained environments and wireless communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and &mgr;TESLA SNEP provides the following important baseline security primitives: Data confidentia ...

SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks

Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, Victor Wen, David E. Culler September 2002 Wireless Networks, Volume 8 Issue 5

Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Full text available: pdf(213.37 KB)

Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, citings, index terms

Wireless sensor networks will be widely deployed in the near future. While much research has focused on making these networks feasible and useful, security has received little

attention. We present a suite of security protocols optimized for sensor networks: SPINS. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and  $\mu$ TESLA. SNEP includes: data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and evidence of data freshness.  $\mu$ TESLA provides authenticated broadcast for severely resource-constrained ...

**Keywords**: MANET, authentication of wireless communication, cryptography, mobile ad hoc networks, secrecy and confidentiality, secure communication protocols, sensor networks

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Authentication and integrity in outsourced databases

Einar Mykletun, Maithili Narasimha, Gene Tsudik

May 2006 ACM Transactions on Storage (TOS), Volume 2 Issue 2

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
Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(531.47 KB) Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, index terms

In the Outsourced Database (ODB) model, entities outsource their data management needs to a third-party service provider. Such a service provider offers mechanisms for its clients to create, store, update, and access (query) their databases. This work provides mechanisms to ensure data integrity and authenticity for outsourced databases. Specifically, this article provides mechanisms that assure the querier that the query results have not been tampered with and are authentic (with respect to the ...

**Keywords**: Outsourced databases, authentication, data authenticity, data integrity, integrity, signature aggregation, storage

<sup>2</sup> Main track: Securing the deluge Network programming system



April 2006 Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Information processing in sensor networks IPSN '06

Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(331.36 KB)

Additional Information: <u>full citation</u>, <u>abstract</u>, <u>references</u>, <u>citings</u>, <u>index</u> <u>terms</u>

A number of multi-hop, wireless, network programming systems have emerged for sensor network retasking but none of these systems support a cryptographically-strong, public-key-based system for source authentication and integrity verification. The traditional technique for authenticating a program binary, namely a digital signature of the program hash, is poorly suited to resource-contrained sensor nodes. Our solution to the secure programming problem leverages authenticated streams, is consisten ...

**Keywords**: authenticated broadcast, dissemination protocols, network programming, security, wireless sensor networks

3 SPINS: security protocols for sensor netowrks

Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, J. D. Tygar

July 2001 Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking MobiCom '01

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4 SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks

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<sup>5</sup> SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP

Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, Marvin Sirbu

August 2004 ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications SIGCOMM '04, Volume 34 Issue 4

Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(236.82 KB) Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, citings, index terms

As our economy and critical infrastructure increasingly relies on the Internet, the insecurity of the underlying border gateway routing protocol (BGP) stands out as the Achilles heel. Recent misconfigurations and attacks have demonstrated the brittleness of BGP. Securing BGP has become a priority. In this paper, we focus on a viable deployment path to secure BGP. We analyze security requirements, and consider tradeoffs of mechanisms that achieve the requirements. In particular, we study how to se ...

Keywords: BGP, Border Gateway Protocol, interdomain routing, routing, security

Formal analysis of card-based payment systems in mobile devices

Vijayakrishnan Pasupathinathan, Josef Pieprzyk, Huaxiong Wang, Joo Yeon Cho

January 2006 Proceedings of the 2006 Australasian workshops on Grid computing

and e-research - Volume 54 ACSW Frontiers '06

Publisher: Australian Computer Society, Inc.

Full text available: pdf(169.95 KB) Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, index terms


To provide card holder authentication while they are conducting an electronic transaction using mobile devices, VISA and MasterCard independently proposed two electronic payment protocols: Visa 3D Secure and MasterCard Secure Code. The protocols use preregistered passwords to provide card holder authentication and Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) for data confidentiality over wired networks and



Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) between a wireless device and a Wirel ...

**Keywords**: card-based systems, electronic payments, formal verification, mobile payment

<sup>7</sup> Short papers -- works in progress: Secured storage using secureParser™



November 2005 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability StorageSS '05

Publisher: ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(397.54 KB) Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, index terms

Securing storage data is a manifold problem with requirements in three dimensions: data security, data integrity, and the safety of data. Meeting the requirements for one dimension often means compromising another. SecureParser™ is a software technology which addresses all three dimensions of secure storage without compromising any. In this paper, we describe the SecureParser™ technology and discuss how it addresses the three dimensions of secured storage: secur ...

**Keywords**: encryption, fabric, file system, parsing

8 Password Management and Digital Signatures: The BiBa one-time signature and



broadcast authentication protocol Adrian Perrig

November 2001 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and **Communications Security CCS '01** 

Publisher: ACM Press

Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, citings, index Full text available: pdf(268.66 KB) terms

We introduce the BiBa signature scheme, a new signature construction that uses one-way functions without trapdoors. BiBa features a low verification overhead and a relatively small signature size. In comparison to other one-way function based signature schemes, BiBa has smaller signatures and is at least twice as fast to verify (which probably makes it one of the fastest signature scheme to date for verification). On the downside, the BiBa public key is large, and the signature generation ...

Keywords: broadcast authentication, one-time signature, signature based on a one-way function without trapdoor, source authentication for multicast

9 Group Key Management and Signatures: Provably authenticated group Diffie-



Hellman key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval, Jean-Jacques Quisquater November 2001 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and **Communications Security CCS '01** 

Publisher: ACM Press

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10 Privacy and authentication: Fourth-factor authentication: somebody you know John Brainard, Ari Juels, Ronald L. Rivest, Michael Szydlo, Moti Yung





# October 2006 Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security CCS '06

**Publisher:** ACM Press

Full text available: pdf(372.40 KB) Additional Information: full citation, abstract, references, index terms

User authentication in computing systems traditionally depends on three factors: something you have (e.g., a hardware token), something you are (e.g., a fingerprint), and something you know (e.g., a password). In this paper, we explore a fourth factor, the social network of the user, that is, somebody you know. Human authentication through mutual acquaintance is an age-old practice. In the arena of computer security, it plays roles in privilege delegation, peer-level certification, help-desk assi ...

Keywords: authentication, hardware tokens, vouchers

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